Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 3

9-1-2011

New Civil Liability for Corporations: The Seventh Circuit Takes a
Stand on the Alien Tort Statute
Xiomara C. Angulo
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Xiomara C. Angulo, New Civil Liability for Corporations: The Seventh Circuit Takes a Stand on the Alien
Tort Statute, 7 Seventh Circuit Rev. 28 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol7/iss1/3

This International Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Angulo: New Civil Liability for Corporations: The Seventh Circuit Takes a

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 7, Issue 1

Fall 2011

NEW CIVIL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATIONS: THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT TAKES A STAND ON THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
XIOMARA C. ANGULO*
Cite as: Xiomara C. Angulo, New Civil Liability for Corporations: The Seventh
Circuit Takes a Stand on the Alien Tort Statute, 7 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 28
(2011), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v7-1/angulo.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
In July 2011, a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel weighed in on an
emerging issue of international law. In Flomo v. Firestone National
Rubber Co., 1 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the majority, held that
corporations can be subjected to civil liability for international law
violations in U.S. courts. 2 Violation of international law claims are
brought under a 222-year-old statute enacted by the First Congress of
the United States—the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). 3 The Seventh
Circuit’s decision was significant in light of its stark contrast with the
Second Circuit’s recent decision Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 4
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit held that corporations cannot be
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; president, International Law Moot Court Honor Society; Northwestern
University, B.A., Political Science & International Studies, June 2008.
1
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). The
joining judges were Judge Daniel A. Manion and Judge William J. Bauer.
2
Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1021.
3
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The statute is also known as the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA).
4
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010),
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
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subjected to potential liability under the ATS since that statute was not
meant to extend to juridical persons. 5 The circuit split arises from
scattered ATS litigation across the country, and more importantly, has
caught the attention of the Supreme Court, which will hear an appeal
from the Second Circuit’s opinion later during the 2011 term. 6
The U.S. Supreme Court has only ruled on the ATS once in the
2004 case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 7 Sosa required U.S. courts
hearing ATS cases to engage in a merits review ensuring that the
underlying breach of international law is in fact a well-established
norm of international law. 8 However, the Supreme Court never ruled
on who can be sued under the ATS, and the statute is silent on the
matter. The significance of haling corporations into American courts
by alleging violations of international law lies with the Court’s
requirement, under Sosa, to examine whether the underlying tort is a
well-established norm of international law. 9 When a plaintiff sues a
foreign public official for the commission of a tort, a court will
consider whether certain torts such as torture, summary execution, and
arbitrary detention constitute breaches of international law. But, when
a plaintiff hales a corporation into court, the range of international
torts the court can consider will be significantly larger—a mere
function of the corporation’s ability to perform actions on a much
larger scale than a single individual. When a corporation can be sued
under the ATS, the courts are free to consider whether large-scale torts
such as child labor or cultural genocide are violations of international
law. 10
5

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145.
See Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Supreme Court Grants Cert in Kiobel,
Deciding to Hear Corporate ATS Case, INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC (Oct. 17,
2011, 11:35 PM), http://harvardhumanrights.wordpress.com/tag/corporate-liability.
7
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
8
Id. at 724.
9
Id.
10
See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2002), where
Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizens brought ATS claims against the oil corporation for
environmental damage and personal injury stemming from Texaco’s oil activities in
the region.
6
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Revisionists argue that allowing American jurists to make these
types of judgments moves the U.S. in the wrong direction. 11 Indeed,
an important question remains whether domestic courts are the
appropriate forum to bring corporations to liability. However, this
question is easily answered by those who view international law as
working in tangent with domestic law, such as Judge Posner. To these
jurists, the issue at hand is one of remedies, and thus one which under
international law is properly addressed at the domestic level. 12 It is
undeniable that under the current state of affairs, the ATS is moving its
way into the domestic courts one circuit at a time and bringing
corporate liability with it.
This note examines the recent Seventh Circuit decision of Flomo
v. Firestone National Rubber, and analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s
rationale for holding that corporations may be subjected to civil
liability under the ATS. While the rationale employed is
unconventional for this area of litigation, it comes as a new analysis
and ultimately squares with other circuit opinions holding that
corporations can be subject to liability under the statute. Part I of this
note provides an historical background of the ATS, dating back to its
inception in the Judiciary Act of 1789, fast-forwarding to its revival in
1980 with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, and ending with more recent ATS
litigation cases. Part II dissects the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Flomo v. Firestone and the court’s rationale for siding with the
corporate liability camp over the corporate immunity camp. Finally,
Section III argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision is legally correct
in holding corporations subject to liability under the ATS.

11

See generally Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2011).
12
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013,1019 (7th Cir. 2011).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to the ATS & the Case that Launched its Modern Use
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) was born with the Judiciary Act of
1789. 13 The ATS provides that “district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 14 Thus,
the ATS allows non-U.S. citizens to seek financial redress from
individuals within U.S. borders for violations of international law
whether those individuals are U.S. citizens or not.15
1. Legislative History of the Act
and the Absence of Reference to “Defendants”
While modern courts have sought clarification of the ATS’s
original intent in the legislative history of the statute, such history is
scarce. However, the Congressional Resolution of 1781 is insightful. 16
The Resolution shows the First Congress’ desire to acquire the
13

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
14
See id. The term “law of nations” is interchangeable with customary
international law. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2nd Cir.
1980).
15
On its face the ATS appears to be a jurisdictional statute only, but debate
over whether the ATS provides foreign plaintiffs with an independent cause of
action was resolved in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain when the Supreme Court noted that,
“the jurisdictional grant is best read as have been enacted on the understanding that
the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.” 542
U.S. 692, 724 (2004). The Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa now requires courts to
entertain a merits review of the existence of a customary international law violation
to establish jurisdiction and proceed in a case. Id. The standard for this merits review
is discussed below in Part (I)(A)(4)(a) and the accompanying footnotes.
16
For a complete discussion on the historical origins of the ATS, including the
text of the 1781 Congressional Report, see William S. Dodge, The Historical
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS
INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996).
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authority to punish international law violations, which at the time,
consisted of a few enumerated causes of action. 17 Originally, the intent
was to authorize criminal sanctions for individuals committing these
violations. 18 But, it followed that civil sanctions would be “an entirely
logical addition.” 19 The recommendations within the 1781
Congressional Resolution were historically succeeded by what became
known as the Marbois affair. 20 In 1784, a French citizen publically
assaulted the French Consul General, Francis Barbe Marbois, in
Philadelphia. 21 The assailant was criminally punished under state law,
but the U.S. Government had no federal recourse to offer the Consul
General since it was limited by powers expressly delegated to it by
Congress. 22 Four years later, in 1788, another similar incident
occurred when a constable in New York City entered the Dutch
Ambassador’s home and attacked him. 23 The assailant in this attack
was also criminally punished by the state court, but again no federal
remedy was available to the Ambassador. 24 The incidents prompted
recommendations to Congress by the Secretary General, John Jay, for
explicit laws providing a federal remedy to the victims of such acts.25
The numerous congressional recommendations of the 1780s were
finally codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789. 26

17

Id.
Id. at 226–27.
19
Id. at 228.
20
Id. at 229.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 229–30.
23
Id. at 230.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.; see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION 827 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that an apparent reason in enacting the ATS
was to “uphold the standing of the United States as a new but reliable member of the
international community” by affording foreign aliens redress if injured by a U.S.
citizen or resident who was violating international law).
18
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2. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala Resuscitates the ATS
Despite the ATS’s animated history, for the first two hundred
years of its existence, use of the Statute was sparse. ATS plaintiffs
established jurisdiction under the act only twice. 27 This lack of use
changed in 1980 when the now-celebrated case of Filartiga v. PenaIrala launched a modern use of the statute. 28 In Filartiga, two
Paraguayan plaintiffs filed a wrongful death suit against a former
Paraguayan government official. 29 The plaintiffs, a political opponent
of the Paraguayan government and his daughter, claimed that a
government official had kidnapped, tortured, and murdered a
seventeen-year old boy, who was the son and brother to the
plaintiffs. 30 Their complaint alleged that the government official
violated various international law statutes when he tortured the boy to
death. 31 Their complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages
27

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004); see also Kenneth
C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Claims: Inquiries into the Alien
Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 1, 4, n. 15 (1985); see also Knowles,
supra note 11, at 1127 (noting that the ATS was invoked two dozen times from
1789–1980, but established jurisdiction only twice).
28
Knowles, supra note 11, at 1127.
29
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d. Cir. 1980).
30
Dr. Joel Filartiga had been a staunch opponent of the Paraguayan President
Alfedo Stroesnner and of his government. Id. After Joelito Filartiga was murdered,
Dolly Filartiga, Dr. Filartiga’s daughter, fled to Washington D.C. and sought
political asylum. Id. Dr. Filartiga followed and remained with her. Id. Thereafter,
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay,
and suspected murderer of Dr. Filartiga’s son, came to the United States on a
visitor’s visa. Id. at 879. He overstayed the visa and remained unlawfully in the
United States with his girlfriend whom had also left Paraguay. Id. Upon finding out
that Pena-Irala was within U.S. boundaries, Dr. Filartiga and his daughter notified
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of Pena-Irala’s illegal presence in
the country. Id. The INS arrested Pena-Irala for unlawfully overstaying his visitor’s
visa, and while he awaited deportation back to Paraguay, Dr. Filartiga and his
daughter filed a complaint. Id. at 878.
31
The complaint included violations of the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration Against
Torture, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and other
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of over $10,000,000. 32 The complaint established jurisdiction over the
claim through 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and under the ATS. 33 While the
district court denied jurisdiction and found for the defendant, on
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. 34
The Second Circuit held that the ATS provided U.S. courts
with the jurisdiction to hear suits brought by foreign plaintiffs
against foreign defendants for international law violations. 35
Writing for the unanimous Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge Kaufman explained that
[a]lthough the Alien Tort Statute has rarely been the basis for
jurisdiction during its history, in light of the foregoing
discussion, there can be little doubt that this action is properly
brought in federal court. This is undeniably an action by an
alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations. 36
While the Filartiga court noted that the ATS was written as a
jurisdiction-granting statute, the court also embraced the statute’s
elements. 37 The elements, as highlighted by the court, are: (1) an
action by an alien (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of
nations. 38 Thus, a court is first required to determine on the merits
whether the alleged violation in the complaint is in fact a recognized
violation of customary international law or a breach of an international

pertinent declarations documents, and practices that constitute customary
international law, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as well as United States Constitution Art. II, sec.
2 and the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 879.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 889.
35
Id. at 887.
36
Id.
37
Id. (“[W]e believe it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not
as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for
adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law.”)
38
Id.

34
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treaty. 39 Indeed, in Filartiga, the court held that torture was a violation
of international law. 40
3. Opposition to and Congressional Approval
of Filartiga’s Holding
The Filartiga decision drew fire from jurists who did not find it fit
for American domestic judges to be determining which actions
constituted violations of international law under ATS litigation. 41
While Filartiga gave renewed and modern life to the ATS, it was but
one court and one holding—subject to interpretation and backlash.
Originalists, also known as Revisionists, took issue with the
correctness of Filartiga’s holding. 42 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, a D.C. Circuit case decided four years after Filartiga, Judge
Bork objected to Filartiga’s merits review process in his concurring

39

The court engages in this determination in Filartiga as well as in Flomo. Compare
the language in Filartiga: “[T]he treaties and accords cited above, as well as express
foreign policy of our own government, all make it clear that international law
confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-à-vis their own governments. While
the ultimate scope of those rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and
elaboration, we hold that the right to be free from torture is now among them.” 630
F.2d at 884, with Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1024 (7th.
Cir. 2011) (“[I]n short, we have not been given an adequate basis for inferring a
violation of customary international law, bearing in mind the Supreme Court’s
insistence on caution in recognizing new norms of customary international law in
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute”).
40
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
41
See generally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (limiting violations of customary international law for purposes of ATS
litigation to those existing in 1789 when the Act was enacted). For an additional
perspective on Judge Bork’s opinion on using international law to interpret
constitutional provisions, see JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS
ACTORS PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 296, (3d. ed. 2010) (“Judge
Robert Bork argue[s] that the [Supreme] Court’s citations to foreign and
international law to the context of constitutional interpretation are ‘risible,’ ‘absurd,’
and ‘flabbergasting.’”).
42
Dodge, supra note 16, at 223.

35
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opinion. 43 Judge Bork argued that the ATS should be limited only to
the causes of action that existed when the ATS was enacted in 1789. 44
A similar position would be adopted almost 20 years later by Justice
Scalia in his concurrence in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 45 The
opposition to Filartiga’s holding stems from the understanding that the
drafters of the ATS intended that causes of action be found in the
federal common law of tort. 46 Judge Bork opposed expansion of ATS
causes of action, 47 and Justice Scalia claims that Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins effectively kills the ATS unless Congress creates a cause of
action for the statute. 48
Despite these Revisionist positions in the case law, Congress
passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in 1992. 49 The
TVPA, an act similar to the ATS, not only codified the Second
Circuit’s holding in Filartiga by creating an express cause of action
for victims of torture and extrajudicial killing, but extended the right to
sue to U.S. citizens. 50 Furthermore, Congress intended for the TVPA
to supplement the ATS, not to replace it. 51 The Congressional
enactment of the TVPA is therefore, crucial to understanding the
Congress’ accepting view of the ATS, and its increasing incision into
U.S. law.

43

Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801(Bork, J., concurring).
See id. at 815 (Bork, J., concurring).
45
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 746 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
46
Id. at 721.
47
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (citation omitted) (Bork, J., concurring).
48
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746.
49
106 Stat. 73 (1992).
50
Dodge, supra note 16, at 224 n.18.
51
Kadic v. Kardazic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), noting:Congress indicated
that the Alien Tort Statute ‘has other uses and should not be replaced,’ because
[‘]Claims based on torture and summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions
that may appropriately be covered [by the Alien Tort Act]. That statute should
remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in
the future into rules of customary international law.[’]
44

36
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4. The Supreme Court Examines the ATS:
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In addition to Congress’ enactment of the TVPA, the U.S.
Supreme Court was able to opine on the ATS in its 2004 case of Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain. 52 In Sosa, the Supreme Court examined the basis
on which the ATS accords lower courts the jurisdiction to hear
customary international law violation claims. 53 Far from overturning
it, the Supreme Court gave the ATS a green light. In a sense, the
majority was vying to keep the ATS alive while the concurrence
militated for the statute’s demise, or at the very least for congressional
approval. The Supreme Court’s Sosa holding set out the test that
would be employed by subsequent reviewing courts. 54 Therefore,
understanding Sosa’s holding and reasoning is important to understand
the current debate surrounding corporate liability under the ATS.
a. The Holding
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the ATS was enacted to
recognize private causes of action for violations of international law
norms. 55 However, the Court found that the ATS allowed for an
expansion of actions beyond those defined to be breaches of
international law in 1789—piracy, infringement on rights of
52

Sosa originated in the Ninth Circuit, and involved DEA agents who hired
Mexican nationals (including Sosa) to capture a Mexican physician, Alvarez, who
was wanted in the United States for the torture and murder of an American DEA
official. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Sosa and other men abducted Alvarez from his
Mexico home and brought him across the border to El Paso where federal officers
arrested him. Id. at 698. Alvarez went to trial on the charges and the district court
granted his Motion for Acquittal. Id. Alvarez then brought suit against Sosa, five
other unnamed Mexican officials, and five DEA officers under the ATS for violation
of international law. Id. The district court granted Alvarez $25,000 in damages. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 699.
53
See generally id. at 712–21 (Section III.A).
54
See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 3541, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1121 (2010).
55
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.

37
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ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct 56 —so long as lower
courts were cautious when determining which causes of action are
viable breaches of international law. 57 The Court stated: “[T]he
judicial power [to recognize actionable international norms] should be
exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to
vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international
norms today.” 58 While the Supreme Court made clear that modern
claims brought under the ATS go beyond 18th-century definition of
international law violations, it set out a cautious standard for this
merits review, limiting actionable international law violations to those
adhering to a specific standard: “We think the courts should require
any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized.” 59 The Supreme Court further noted
that “federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar § 1350 was enacted” 60 Accordingly, the
Court gave the ATS a malleability to develop at the same pace that
internationally accepted norms developed. It gave its approval without
giving lower courts carte blanche to determine international law
violations.

56

Id.
Id. at 729.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 725. The Court reiterated its position, stating, “Whatever the ultimate
criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are
persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when
§ 1350 was enacted.” Id. at 732.
60
Id.
57

38
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b. The Reasoning
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter laid out four principle
reasons why the ATS accorded lower courts jurisdiction over
international law violation claims. 61 First, he noted that when the ATS
was enacted, the First Congress was aware of a limited set of actions
that constituted the “law of nations.” 62 These international law norms
were recognized in federal common law at the time. 63 Next, Justice
Souter relied on historic accounts to note that the ATS was meant to
give civil remedies to common law claims arising from international
law. 64 He reasoned that the ATS was “intended to have practical effect
the moment it became law” even if the language in the statute was
solely jurisdictional. 65 Justice Souter concluded that based on the
response to the ATS, and to the historical debate surrounding it, the
jurisdictional grant was enacted on the understanding that the common
law could provide a cause of action based on the international law
violations that existed at the time. 66 Thirdly, Justice Souter pointed out
that Congress has not amended the ATS or limited civil common law
power under it. 67 Finally, Justice Souter noted that domestic law
recognizes international law, 68 and that international law is one of the
few narrow areas where federal common law continues to exist. 69

61

Id. at 712–22.
Id. at 715.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 721.
65
Id. at 724.
66
Id.; see Part (I)(A)(4)(c) below (discussing Scalia’s opposing argument that
Erie has repudiated common law as a cause of action in American jurisprudence).
67
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
68
Id. at 729-30 (citation omitted).
69
Id. at 730 (citing to Tex. Indus. Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 641 (1981)).
62

39
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c. The Concurring Opinion
The majority opinion’s rationale in Sosa was by no means
unanimous. Justice Scalia’s concurrence is noteworthy because it
sheds light on the academic debate that surrounds this piece of
legislation. 70 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, adopting an
Originalist point of view, highlighted his concern that the ATS rests at
odds with Erie Railroad Co., v. Tompkins. 71 According to Justice
Scalia, the ATS is solely a jurisdictional statute and is itself useless
without a congressional grant making international law violations
actionable claims. 72 Justice Scalia explained that Erie did away with
general common law, and that post-Erie, a few exceptions such as
admiralty law and Bivens claims have been given the status of “federal
common law.” 73 To Justice Scalia, the real issue is whether the ATS
should be a basis for a new type of federal common law as it can no
longer exist under general common law and by itself does not create a
cause of action: “The general common law was the old door. We do
not close that door today for the deed was done in Erie. Federal
common law is the new door. The question is not whether the door
will be left ajar, but whether the Court will open it.” 74 To Justice
Scalia, the answer to that question is inevitably a negative one. Justice
Scalia discussed how the only approximation to the creation of a new
federal common law for ATS would be Bivens 75 and how even Bivens
is “a relic of the heady days when this Court assumed common-law
powers to create causes of action.” 76 He also highlighted his concern
for the Court to be the entity to develop new federal common law: “In
70

See generally Knowles, supra note 11.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 747, 750.
73
Id. at 741. Federal common law being judge-created law based on a
congressional grant aiming to protect vital federal interests. Id.
74
Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
75
See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(creating a federal cause of action for civil rights violations).
76
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 742.
71

40
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holding open the possibility that judges may create rights where
Congress has not authorized them to do so, the Court countenances
judicial occupation of a domain that belongs to the people’s
representatives.” 77 In short, the whole idea to Justice Scalia is
“nonsense upon stilts.” 78
With Justice Scalia militating against the continued life of the
ATS, Sosa created a standard on which lower courts could proceed to
hear cases involving violations of international law. 79 The one thing
Sosa made clear was that the violation must be recognized by civilized
nations. 80 The norm must be entrenched in international law. 81 Yet,
despite this caution-invoking standard, the Court still sanctioned the
possibility of bringing ATS suits for the years to come.
B. The Rise of Corporate Liability under the ATS
One issue the Supreme Court definitely ruled on in Sosa was
liability for corporations. 82 Like Filartiga, the defendant in Sosa was a
former government official. 83 Therefore, the facts did not lend
themselves to Supreme Court commentary over who a trespasser need
be for purposes of ATS litigation. Yet, prior to the Supreme Court’s
holding in Sosa, foreign plaintiffs had already begun to bring suits
against non-government actors.84

77

Id. at 747.
Id. at 743.
79
Id. at 724.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
In its infamous footnote, the Supreme Court noted that, “whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.” Id. at 732 n.20. As will be discussed below in Part (III)(B),this dicta did
not definitely hold or exclude corporations from potential liability under the ATS.
83
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878(2d. Cir. 1980); Sosa, 542 U.S. at
692.
84
See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2002).
78
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1. Doe I v. Unocal Corp. and the Aiding and Abetting Cases
The first reported case in which foreign plaintiffs availed
themselves of the ATS to sue corporations for international law
violations was Doe I v. Unocal Corp. 85 In Doe I, the Ninth Circuit
entertained a claim against a corporation for egregious violations of
international conventions against forced labor and torture. 86 The Ninth
Circuit found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether
the corporation could have been liable for aiding and abetting
government actions that subjected plaintiffs to forced labor, torture,
rape, and summary execution. 87 The court also found that the
corporation could be held liable for international law violations and
remanded the case to the district court for that determination. 88
Consistent with the ruling in Doe I, the Second Circuit ruled in 2002,
in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., that the ATS confers
jurisdiction over multinational corporations that collaborate with
governments and aid and abet those governments in committing
international law violations. 89
2. Cases Seeking Direct Corporate Liability:
State Action Not Required
All cases originally filed against corporate defendants were
brought under the ATS, but the claim was that the corporations had
aided and abetted some government actor to violate international
law. 90 However, the foreign plaintiffs in a recent case, Abdullahi v.
Pfizer, Inc., brought claims alleging that the corporation itself had

85

Doe. I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 936.
87
Id. at 953.
88
Id. at 963.
89
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007)
(also known as the South African Apartheid Litigation).
90
E.g. Doe I, 395 F.3d 932.
86
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violated international law. 91 The plaintiffs claimed that a
pharmaceutical company had tested certain medication on village
children without any parental consent, and that the nonconsensual
testing violated international law. 92 Writing for the majority in
Abdullahi, Judge Parker reiterated the Supreme Court’s cautious
merits review test which it laid out in Sosa:
[R]emaining mindful of our obligation to proceed cautiously
and self-consciously in this area, we determine whether the
norm alleged (1) is a norm of international character that
States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of
legal obligation; (2) is defined with a specificity comparable
to the 18th-century paradigms discussed in Sosa; and (3) is of
mutual concern to States. 93
The majority found the pharmaceutical company to be potentially
liable, but remanded the case to the district court for consideration of
whether nonconsensual testing met the level of recognition of
customary international law that Sosa requires. 94
The dissent strongly critiqued the majority’s omission of Pfizer’s
corporate identity when it considered whether ATS jurisdiction
applied. The dissent proposed that the majority deviated from the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Sosa by doing so. 95 In his dissent, Judge
Wesley stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has required courts deciding whether a
principle is a customary international law norm to consider
“whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
91

Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3541, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1121 (2010).
92
Id. at 168.
93
Id. at 174.
94
Id. at 177.
95
Id. at 194 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
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defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.” . . . [T]he majority's analysis would be no
different if Plaintiffs had sued the Nigerian government,
instead of, or in addition to, Pfizer. Such a broad, simplified
definition ignores the clear admonitions of the Supreme
Court—and conflicts with prior decisions of this Court—that
a customary international law norm cannot be divorced from
the identity of its violator. 96
Judge Wesley’s dissenting rationale in Abdullahi would be
embraced by the Second Circuit one year later in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Corp. 97 Both cases attempted to bring the issue of
corporate liability under the ambit of the Supreme Court’s merits
review. 98 As subsequent litigation demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s
merits review requirement coupled with its language in the infamous
footnote twenty of the case would become the source of the current
misconception that corporate liability needs to derive precedent from
international law. 99
The trend of holding private parties, such as corporations, directly
liable for international law violations committed without the
requirement of state action stems from Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic. 100 It was later expanded upon in Kadic v. Karadzic. 101 Both
96

Id. at 193–94 (citation omitted).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127-128 (2d Cir. 2010),
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
98
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724. Both cases rely heavily, if
not solely, on the Supreme Court’s dicta in footnote twenty of the case. Id. at 732
n.20.
99
See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
100
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In TelOren, the plaintiffs brought claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization
which the D.C. Circuit held no to be a recognized state. Id. at 791. Because the PLO
was not a recognized state, the defendants could not be acting under color of law in
the manner in which the Paraguayan official had in Filartiga. Id. The court reasoned
that there are a handful of crimes to which “the law of nations attributes individual
responsibility,” although it did not find non-state torture to be one of those crimes.
Id. at 795; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d. Cir. 1995) (noting that
97
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cases held that jus cogens 102 violations did not require state action. In
Kadic, the court held:
“[A]cts of rape, torture, and summary execution,” like most
crimes, “are proscribed by international law only when
committed by state officials or under color of law” to the
extent that they were committed in isolation, these crimes
“are actionable under the Alien Tort [Claims] Act, without
regard to state action, to the extent that they were committed
in pursuit of genocide or war crimes.” 103
The court in Doe I v. Unocal Corp. found forced labor to be a
variant of slavery so in the same vein as the Kadic holding, crimes of
forced labor would not require state action. 104 By doing so, the Ninth
Circuit began a trend that corporations may be directly liable under the
ATS without aiding and abetting state action.
C. Current Decisions on Corporate Liability under the ATS:
Who Said What and Why
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.:
Corporate Immunity for International Law Violations
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. Co., is the most recent Second
Circuit case where, in a detour from its previous precedent, the Second
Circuit expressly held that customary international law did not extend

Filartiga found official torture to be a violation of customary international law)
(emphasis in original).
101
Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
102
Violations of jus cogens include slavery, genocide and war crimes.
Courtney Shaw, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359, 1362, 1370 nn.82, 83 (June 2002).
103
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243–44 (citation omitted).
104
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002).
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to corporations. 105 In short, the Second Circuit concluded that because
international law does not apply to corporations, the ATS could not be
used as a basis to confer jurisdiction over corporations. 106 An appeal is
currently before the Supreme Court, which will rule on the case this
term. 107
a. The Facts
In Kiobel, Nigerian plaintiffs filed a claim in the Southern District
of New York against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations for
allegedly aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in committing
human rights abuses. 108 The corporations were present in the Ogoni
region of Nigeria to explore and exploit oil.109 The plaintiffs alleged
that the corporate defendants hired the Nigerian government to clear
out village opposition to gas exploration in the Ogoni region. 110 The
plaintiffs also alleged that the corporations aided the government
officials who engaged in extrajudicial killings; torture; cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment of villagers; property deprivation;
and forced exile. 111 The district court dismissed certain counts on the
grounds that the violations alleged did not meet the specificity
requirement set forth in Sosa and certified an appeal for those issues
not dismissed. 112 On appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the
plaintiffs’ remaining claims on the grounds that corporations could not
be held civilly liable under international law. 113

105

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrolium Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010),
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
106
Id.
107
See footnote 6 above.
108
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 124.
113
Id.
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b. Kiobel’s Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Cabranes set out several premises
justifying what is essentially corporate immunity against ATS claims.
First, the majority opinion stated that the corporation must be liable for
the violation under international law standards. 114 The majority
reasoned that the Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa requires lower
courts to look beyond domestic law and into international law to
determine the possibility of corporate liability. 115 In looking to
international law, the majority noted that international law historically
has a penchant against instituting corporate liability for violations of
customary international law. 116 The majority’s main contention was
that corporations cannot be liable for violations of international law
because there is no standard for criminal corporate punishment in
either international law or domestic laws. 117 As an example, the Judge
Cabranes looked to international criminal tribunals including the
114

Id. at 118; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20

(2004).
115

“[I]n Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the lower federal courts to consider
‘whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual’ . . . That language requires that we look to international
law to determine our jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular type of
defendant such as corporations.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127(citations omitted). The
Kiobel court additionally emphasizes the judicial precedent based on Sosa in looking
to the particular defendant’s identity: “We have looked to international law to
determine whether state officials, private individuals, and aiders and abettors can be
held liable under the ATS. There is no principled basis for treating the question of
corporate liability differently.” Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
116
The court explained:
“customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate
liability for international crimes, and no international tribunal has ever held a
corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations”. Id. at 120. This proposition
is vehemently rejected in the concurrence, which calls it internally and inherently
inconsistent with prior Supreme Court decisions and prior case law. Id. at 152
(Leval, J., concurring).
117
Id. at 147; contra Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human
Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U. J.INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008).
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Nuremberg trials and highlighted the absence of holding corporations
liable for international law violations in these tribunals. 118 The court
highlighted that responsibility for customary international law
violations cannot be “divorced” from individual moral
responsibility. 119 The court also looked to international treaties noting
that no treaty has codified corporate liability. 120 As a result, the
majority concluded that sources of international law do not reveal
corporate liability to be a customary international law norm
recognized by civilized nations. 121 Because corporate liability is not a
norm of customary international law, the court held the ATS to be
inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ claims against the corporate
defendants. 122
c. Kiobel’s Concurring Opinion
The Kiobel decision was unanimous. However, Judge Leval wrote
a lengthy concurrence in which he meticulously rejected each point the
majority propounded in reaching its controversial conclusion. Judge
Leval stated, “[a]ccording to the rule my colleagues have created, one
who earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental
118

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133, 136 (noting that the Nuremberg Tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda all confined tribunal jurisdiction to natural persons
only). To the extent that that the majority opinion considered the lack of precedent
for corporate accountability in criminal tribunals, the concurrence notes the
irrelevancy of what happens in a criminal forum to the precedent for civil corporate
liability under the ATS—a civil statute. Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
119
Id. at 135.
120
Id. at 137.
121
Id. at 148–49.
122
The court noted: “No corporation has ever been subject to any form of
liability (whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international law
of human rights. Rather, sources of customary international law have, on several
occasions, explicitly rejected the idea of corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability
has not attained a discernable, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the
world in their relations inter se, and it cannot not, as a . . . result, form the basis of a
suit under the ATS.” Id.(emphasis in original).
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human rights can successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims
for compensation simply by taking the precaution of conducting the
heinous operation in the corporate form.” 123 Judge Leval’s position
was that the ATS is an act that imposes civil liability, and that,
therefore, global precedent for criminal corporate liability is
irrelevant. 124 Civil liability for corporations is allowed because the
punishment serves the end goal of compensating damaged victims. 125
On the other hand, the goal of criminal punishment is a punitive one,
and criminal punishment of corporations cannot punish. 126
Accordingly, to Judge Leval, the majority’s rationale was flawed, and
corporate liability should attach under ATS. 127
2. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
The year after the Second Circuit ruled in Kiobel, the D.C. Circuit
took its turn to consider the issue of aiding and abetting liability for
corporations in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 128 The D.C. Circuit
distinguished between the Sosa analysis required for international law
norms and that of corporate liability. 129 Noting corporate liability to be
a completely different issue from those considered in Sosa, the D.C.
Circuit avoids considering the “wrong question” of whether customary
international law establishes corporate liability as considered in
Kiobel. 130 The D.C. Circuit identified corporate liability as an issue of
agency law. 131 To the D.C. Circuit, the issue is whether corporations
123

Id. at 149–50 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id. at 169 (Leval, J., concurring).
125
Id. (Leval, J., concurring).
126
Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
127
See id. at 196.
128
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11(D.C. Cir. 2011).
129
Id. at 41.
130
Id. (“Our conclusion differs from that of the Second Circuit in Kiobel
because its analysis conflates the norms of conduct issue in Sosa and the rules for
any remedy to be available in federal common law at issue here”) (citation omitted).
131
Id.
124
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can be held liable to pay money damages for the violations of
international law that their agents commit. 132 Labeling corporate
liability as an accoutrement to causes of action under the ATS, the
D.C. Circuit noted that because international law does not provide any
civil remedies or private causes of action, federal courts must turn to
federal common law to determine whether corporations can be held
liable. 133 U.S. agency law provides for corporate liability. 134 Next, the
D.C. Circuit considered the text of the ATS, which it noted “does not
distinguish among classes of defendants.” 135 The court also considered
the historical context of the enactment of the ATS, and indicated that
nothing suggests that the First Congress would have allowed
corporations to escape the liability it was trying to impose on
individuals under the ATS. 136 Instead, the Court highlighted, corporate
liability was an accepted principle of tort at the time the ATS was
enacted in 1789, and that therefore, corporate liability today is actually
consistent with the original intent behind enacting the ATS. 137 The
court also considered the fact that numerous international treaties
provide that juridical actors such as corporations must comply with
international law. 138 Finally, the D.C. Circuit claimed that Kiobel
ignored the Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa that federal common law
would supply the remedy for ATS claims to the extent that the tort is
determined by federal common law. 139 The D.C. Circuit’s extensive
analysis of corporate liability in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. provided a
sound basis on which the Seventh Circuit could follow.

132

Id.
Id. at 41–42.
134
Id. at 56.
135
Id. at 43.
136
Id. at 47.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 48–49.
139
Id. at 54–55.
133
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II. FLOMO V. FIRESTONE NATURAL RUBBER CO.:
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CHIMES IN
A. The Facts
On April 19, 2006, a case similar to the ATS suits filed around the
country was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana. 140 In that suit, twenty-three Liberian plaintiffs
alleged international law violations of forced labor against Firestone
Natural Rubber Company (“Firestone”).141 Firestone owned and
operated approximately 118,000 acres of rubber tree plantations in
Liberia. 142 It employed local natives to extract latex from the rubber
trees. 143 These employees, known as tappers, had to meet a daily quota
of 650 trees per day in order to keep their jobs, and so, the tappers
required their children to help—anything to avoid “joining the ranks of
the starving unemployed.” 144 When the plaintiffs brought claims of
human rights violations against Firestone, the district court dismissed
all of the claims except for the children’s claim brought by their
parents as next friends that they were subjected to the “worst form” of
child labor under various international conventions. 145 The district
court held that this claim was actionable under the ATS. 146 Moreover,
while the plaintiffs’ claim on child labor proceeded, the Second Circuit
decided Kiobel. 147 Firestone filed a motion for summary judgment,
and absent any Seventh Circuit guidance on the issue, 148 the Southern
140

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co. (“Flomo I”), 744 F.Supp.2d 810
(S.D.Ind. 2010), and (“Flomo II”), No. 1:06-cv-00627-JMS-TAB, 2010 WL
4174583, at *1 (S.D. Ind., Oct. 19, 2010).
141
Flomo II, 2010 WL 4174583, at *2.
142
Flomo I, 643 F.3d at 1015.
143
Flomo II, 2010 WL 4174583, at *2.
144
Id.
145
Id. at *3.
146
Id.
147
Flomo I, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
148
Flomo II, 2010 WL 4174583, at *2.
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District of Indiana relied on Kiobel’s holding that corporations could
not be sued under the ATS to grant the motion. 149
B. The Appeal
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit engaged in a two-fold analysis,
determining first, whether non-natural persons can be defendants
under the ATS, and second, whether the evidence presented in the case
could establish that Firestone had violated customary international
law. 150 While the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
Firestone due to lacking evidence establishing international law
violations at the level required by Sosa, 151 it expressly rejected the
district court’s holding that corporations could not be sued. 152 Judge
Posner, writing for a unanimous court, stated, “[t]he factual premise of
the majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.” 153 The court
specifically rejected Kiobel’s logic that corporations could not be
liable for violations of international law because corporations have
never been held criminally liable for such violations. 154 Judge Posner

149

Id. In its supplemental opinion the district court also explained that
Firestone was entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiffs had not presented
factual evidence that could establish a viable claim of “worst form” of child labor.
Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d. at 816.
150
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co. (“Flomo III”), 643 F.3d 1013, 1015
(7th Cir. 2011).
151
Id. at 1024.
152
Id. at 1025.
153
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1017.
154
Id. As a point of reference, the Second Circuit in Kiobel analogized to the
Nuremberg Trials and to the lack of accountability for the corporations that aided
Nazi Germany. Id. (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit also looked at the
Nuremberg trials and concluded: “If a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes
could be punished criminally for violating customary international law, as we
believe I could be, then a fortiori if the board of directors of a corporation direct, the
corporation’s managers to commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors,
or use slave labor, the corporation could be civilly liable.” Id. at 1018 (citation
omitted); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
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focused on the possibility of creating new precedent instead of relying
on its absence. 155 He reasoned: “Suppose no corporation had ever
been punished for violating customary international law. There is
always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm; there has to be.
Before the Nuremberg Tribunal was created there were no
multinational prosecutions for aggression and crimes against
humanity.” 156
In determining why corporations can be civilly liable for
international law violations, Judge Posner laid out three main
arguments. 157 First, Judge Posner contended that at least some
historical precedent for civil corporate liability in international law
exists. 158 Second, he stated that domestic law determines what
remedies are available for customary international law violations.159
Finally, Judge Posner reasoned that because domestic law does so,
U.S. courts can consider civil and criminal liability for corporations in
the U.S. as an analogous sibling to civil corporate liability under the
ATS. 160
After briefly recapping the Supreme Court’s understanding of
customary international law in Sosa, Judge Posner considered
Firestone’s argument that juridical persons’ conduct can never be a
violation of international law. 161 Firestone’s basis for this argument
was that corporations, unlike individuals, have never been subject to
criminal liability under international law. 162 In fact, this argument

(noting that the “Allies determined that I.G. Farben had committed violations of the
law of nations and therefore destroyed it.”) (citation omitted).
155
Flomo III, 642 F.3d at 1017.
156
Id. (emphasis in original).
157
Id. at 1018.
158
Id. at 1021.
159
Id. at 1020.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1017 (“conduct by a corporation or any other entity that does not have
a heartbeat…can never be a violation of customary international law, no matter how
heinous the conduct”).
162
Id.
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formed a bulk of the majority’s opinion in Kiobel. 163 But Judge Posner
was quick to point out that the factual premise of the Kiobel opinion
was incorrect. 164 Judge Posner refuted the Second Circuit’s example
that German corporations assisting the Nazi war effort were never
criminally tried, and that, as a result, no criminal liability precedent for
corporations exists. 165 Notably, Judge Posner pointed out that the
corporations were dissolved under authority of international law, and
that the Allies’ Control Counsel and Coordinating Committee ordered
seizure of the corporations’ assets and made some assets available to
the victims for reparations. 166 Additionally, Judge Posner points to
18th-century in rem judgments against pirate ships to demonstrate
some historical precedent for civil liability of corporations, if one is
sought. 167 In conclusion, Judge Posner’s first contention was that there
is not a complete void of international precedent for corporate civil
liability. 168
Next, Judge Posner considered why criminal corporate liability
compliments civil corporate liability in the U.S. The essence of the
court’s argument is that domestic law determines what kinds of
remedies are available for international law violations. 169 Although the
court acknowledged that criminal corporate liability is a uniquely
Anglo-American concept, it dispensed with the notion of such liability

163

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,131–45 (2d Cir. 2010),
reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
164
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1017.
165
Id.
166
Id. (citation omitted).
167
Id. at 1018. Admittedly, the argument is more of a reference than an
analytical comparison.
168
Judge Posner does admit that even in the complete absence of historical
precedent for corporate civil liability, there is always “a first time for litigation to
enforce a norm; there has to be.” Id. at 1017.
169
Id. at 1020; see also Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 651 F.3d 11, 22 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
ATS “establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law
remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law”).
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being anomalous. 170 Because we cannot imprison a corporation, courts
will fine corporations that commit criminal acts—through their board
of directors or other employees. 171 While criminal liability is critiqued,
Judge Posner noted that we continue to use it in the United States and
that we would use it even more if civil liability were unavailable.172
He also noted that international resistance to corporate liability is
quickly eroding. 173 According to Judge Posner, civil liability follows
any action that is criminally liable, and, in the absence of the
possibility of criminal liability, civil liability should be the very least
imposed on corporations. 174 As a secondary policy consideration to
support this point, Judge Posner pointed out that the possibility of
suing a corporation makes available the resources to compensate the
victims that would not be available were the corporations’ board
members the only potential defendants. 175
In conclusion, Flomo emphasized that: (1) domestic tribunals such
as U.S. courts are the proper forum for remedial considerations
stemming from civil liability; 176 (2) that individual nations decide how
to impose the substantive obligations set out in international law; 177
and (3) that even certain international treaties authorize domestic
enforcement of customary international law violations, criminal and

170

See Dodge, supra note 16 (noting that William Blackstone wrote
extensively on England’s criminal punishment for individuals committing customary
international law violations as early as the eighteenth century).
171
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 1020 (“Justice Breyer has opined that ‘universal criminal jurisdiction
necessarily contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.’”)
(citation omitted).
175
Id.
176
Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d. Cir. 1995)).
177
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 422–23 (1965)).
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civil. 178 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit concluded that corporate
liability is possible under the ATS, but that in this case the plaintiffs
had not pleaded sufficient facts to establish the actual existence of
forced labor on the rubber plantation. 179
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT & WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
RULED CORRECTLY
Aside from a reference or two, the Seventh Circuit does not attack
Kiobel’s analysis head on. Instead, the Seventh Circuit choose a few
limited points on which to base its opinion. These points are: (1) that
international law supports civil liability for corporations through
eroding resistance to criminal liability, the existence of which would
necessarily entail an acceptance of international civil liability; 180 and
(2) that international law requires enforcement in the domestic arena
and sanctions domestic determination of remedies.
A. Eroding Resistance to criminal corporate sanctions
may engender acceptance of civil corporate liability
within the international community even if it does not exist today.
In Flomo, Judge Posner suggested that the reticence toward
criminally and civilly prosecuting punishable corporations in the
international sphere could stem from an historical desire to retain
prosecution for the worst forms of international law violations. 181 As
an example, he used the prosecution of Nazi war criminals during the
178

Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019 (using as an example the OECD Convention on
Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, arts. 2, 3).
179
Id. at 1021.
180
Id. at 1020 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.692, 763 (2004)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
181
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1018 (“[I]t seems rather that the paucity of cases
reflects a desire to keep liability, whether personal or institutional, for [international
law] violations within tight bounds by confining it to abhorrent conduct-the kind of
conduct that invites criminal sanctions”).

56
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011

29

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 7, Issue 1

Fall 2011

Nuremberg Trials. 182 Judge Posner noted, “it was natural that a
tradition would develop of punishing violations of customary
international law by means of national or international criminal
proceedings; it was a way of underscoring the gravity of violating
customary international law.” 183 However, the tradition to keep
corporate liability separate from criminal prosecution of government
officials 184 has begun to chip at the edges. 185 For example, criminal
responsibility for non-state actors who aid and abet international law
violations “has been accepted as one of the core principles of the postWorld War II war crimes trials.” 186 Furthermore, scholarship has
revealed that the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Rome
treaty, omitted juridical persons from mandatory jurisdiction of the
court for purposes for practical purposes. 187 Since few countries in the
world currently allow criminal corporate responsibility, but all signing
countries are bound by the Rome statute, criminal corporate
responsibility under the Rome Treaty would have applied to countries
where criminal corporate responsibility is not embraced.188 As this is a
difficult issue, the five-week period allotted to negotiating the Rome
Treaty was insufficient to fully compromise on the matter. 189 This lead
Professor Doug Cassel, to state that, “the opposition was not so much
on principle as on grounds of practicality: there was no time during the

182

Id.
Id.
184
See Cassel, supra note 117, at 44 (noting that the Nuremberg Charter allows
the denomination of corporations or groups as criminal but not at the trial of an
“individual.”). Cassel also notes that most tribunals have jurisdiction over natural
persons only. Id.
185
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019 (“It is neither surprising nor significant that
corporate liability hasn’t figured in prosecutions of war criminals and other violators
of customary international law”).
186
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d, 11, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted).
187
Cassel, supra note 117, at 46.
188
Id.
189
Id.
183
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five-week Rome conference to revise domestic legislation.” 190 In
short, the contention of Kiobel and the one that Firestone relies on (so
did Exxon Mobil in the D.C. Circuit), is that international law does not
apply to corporations absent certain exceptions. 191 To Judge Posner,
this absence of prosecutorial zeal is not a sufficient basis on which to
exonerate corporations from criminal and civil liability.192 In fact,
Judge Posner hypothesized: “Suppose it’s the case that the only
actionable violations of customary international law . . . are acts so
maleficent that criminal punishment would be an appropriate sanction
for the actors. It would not follow that civil sanctions would be
improper.” 193
Additionally, while criminal corporate liability does not exist in
many countries outside of the United States, 194 and while criminal
liability is a peripheral form of social control in other countries, the
resistance to apply criminal liability to corporations is eroding within

190

Id. at 47.
Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable?
Achilles Heel in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227,
283 (2011) (noting that “in the main, the law of nations, applies to nations, but in
cases of certain grave acts (involuntary servitude, genocide) the law of nations
applies to jus cogens offenses”).
192
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co. (“Flomo III”), 643 F.3d 1010, 1019
(7th Cir. 2011) (“That doesn’t mean corporations are exempt from [customary
international law]”); see also Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of
International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 35 n.135 (2011) (“One need not
agree with . . . expert opinions that the absence of explicit international law examples
making corporations criminally liable establishes that no ATCA liability is possible .
. . Even assuming that under the ATCA, this aspect of a viable claim is to be
determined by international and not U.S. law, the question that might be posed is
whether international law precludes finding corporate liability not whether it
explicitly authorizes it.”)(citations omitted).
193
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020.
194
See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability:
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 142, (October 2008) (noting that Germany, for
example, only has administrative sanctions for corporate transgressions).
191
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the international community. 195 Several international treaties and
conventions now incorporate provisions for both criminal and civil
responsibility. 196 Beginning with the OECD Convention against
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, a trend towards imposing criminal responsibility on
corporations has been contagious. 197 This increased existence and
acceptance of criminal liability for corporations leads to a similar
acceptance of civil liability. In his concurring opinion in Sosa, Justice
Breyer noted that “universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily
contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.” 198
Finally, criminal corporate responsibility is seen as a policy tool to
provide some reparation where civil damages might not be
available. 199 The Seventh Circuit differs in this respect from Judge
Leval’s concurrence in Kiobel, where Judge Leval claims that criminal
punishment of corporations is irrelevant to ATS analysis because the
goals of criminal punishment cannot apply to corporations. 200 The
Seventh Circuit asserts otherwise. 201 From a policy perspective, the
Seventh Circuit contends that in fact, civil damages require harm, and
criminal punishment can provide justice in cases where no harm is
materialized but where the conduct was nonetheless abhorrent. 202
195

Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1019; see also Cassel, supra note 117, at 48 (noting
the emerging international law trend to impose criminal liability on corporate
actors).
196
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020.
197
Cassel, supra note117, at 48.
198
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020 (citation omitted).
199
Id.
200
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 167 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Leval, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 472 (2011); see also Part (I)(C) above.
201
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1018 (“Criminal punishment of corporations that
commit crimes is not anomalous merely because a corporation cannot be imprisoned
or executed. It can be fined”).
202
Id. (noting examples such as fraud where shareholders cannot prove
causation, or misrepresenting efficacy of drugs where buyers are not harmed because
no other alternative drug could have worked anyway).
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Criminal punishment cannot punish a corporation through
imprisonment, but it can achieve a punitive end through fines. 203
The erosion of criminal punishment of corporations demonstrates
the trend amongst the international community that as a remedy, the
international community does embrace criminal sanctions. If the
international community embraces criminal sanctions, which have a
higher threshold of acceptance, it only follows that it would also
embrace civil liability.
B. International Law leaves the determination of remedies to the
domestic sphere.
Notwithstanding the international community’s increasing
emphasis on criminal corporate responsibility, international law does
leave the enforcement of international law violations to the domestic
sphere. 204 This is Judge Posner’s second point in Flomo. 205 To fully
understand his analysis, it is critical to point out a much-discussed
“distinction” that permeates ATS litigation cases. 206 This distinction
involves separating a question of whether a norm is recognized and
accepted as customary international law among nations, 207 and
whether a remedy exists when corporations are the actors that happen

203

Id. at 1019.
DUNOFF, supra note 41, at 243 (“International law frequently says little
about how governments should implement their international legal obligations”).
205
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020 (citation omitted).
206
See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“The dissent’s objection to corporate liability . . . disregards both a fundamental
distinction between causes of action based on conduct that violates [international
law] and the remedy under domestic law, and a source of international law”); Flomo,
643 F.3d at 1019 (“We keep harping on criminal liability for violations of customary
international law in order to underscore the distinction between a principle of that
law, which is a matter of substance, and the means of enforcing it, which a matter of
procedure or remedy”).
207
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
204
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to violate that norm. 208 As the D.C. Circuit noted, Sosa only touched
on the first point. 209 Considering the first prong of the distinction, in
Sosa, the Supreme Court highlighted the requirement that, to establish
jurisdiction under the ATS, a reviewing court should determine
whether a norm is one of customary international law—that is, “of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized.” 210 Such a merits review requires a
district court to consider whether state practice on the international
level condemns the particular underlying tort. Thus, the merits review
applies international law to the underlying cause of action—torture,
extrajudicial killings, nonconsensual medical testing or forced labor,
for example—but not to the prospective class of defendants. 211 This is
distinct from determining whether corporations are subject to
responsibility for violating these norms. 212
The second prong of the distinction implicates some international
law theory. International law does not operate in a vacuum. 213 It is a
structure that governs individual sovereigns who keep that sovereignty
with respect instead of being mandatorily subjected to it. As a result,
international law depends on those sovereign nation states to
implement it by incorporating it into their domestic law. 214 The
Supreme Court in Sosa reiterated that remedies is a common area
where domestic law and international law overlap: “The law of nations
generally does not create private causes of action to remedy its
208

See generally Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11. This is precisely where the Kiobel
court faltered in its analysis. The Second Circuit conflates the issue of merits review
with that of determining liability for corporations. Id. at 41.
209
Id. at 18.
210
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
211
Id.
212
See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41.
213
See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co. (“Flomo III”), 643 F.3d 1010, 1015
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[c]ustomary international law is discerned from myriad decisions
made in numerous and varied international and domestic arenas.”) (quoting Flores v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248–49 (2d. Cir. 2003)) .
214
DUNOFF, supra note 41, at 239.
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violations, but leaves to each national the task of defining remedies
that are available.” 215
In Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil, the D.C. circuit entertained a
thorough analysis of the issue, noting that, “[t]he law of
nations . . . creates no civil remedies and no private right of action that
federal courts must determine the nature of any remedy in lawsuits
alleging violations of the law of nations by reference to federal
common law rather than customary international law.” 216 Judge
Rogers, writing the majority opinion, proceeded to cite Professor
Louis Henkin, “a leading authority on international law” who stated,
“International law itself does not require any particular reaction to
violation of law . . . whether and how the United States should react to
such violations are domestic, political questions: the court will not
assume any particular reaction, remedy or consequence.”217 Because
international law leaves the determination of remedies to the
individual nation states, domestic law determines whether corporations
are to be subject to liability under the ATS. Thus, a reviewing court
would need to consider domestic, not international precedent for
corporate liability in ATS litigation. Corporate liability is not such a
tort; therefore, there is no need to consider whether state practice on
the international level condemns or accepts corporate liability.
In Flomo, Judge Posner cited to specific examples that
demonstrate that international law leaves the determination of
remedies to the domestic sphere. 218 For example, the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) provides that
“in the event that, under the legal system of a Party [to the
Convention], criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons,
that Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including
215

Id.
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 42.
217
Id. (citing to LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CONSTITUTION 245–46 (2d ed. 1996)).
218
Flomo III, 643 F.3d at 1020.
216

AND THE

UNITED STATES
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monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign public officials.” 219 The
language of the Convention demonstrates that nation states are to
choose and impose the necessary sanctions on international law
transgressions since international law does not do this itself. Thus,
nation states look to their own domestic law, in this case, U.S. federal
common law to do so. 220 As is seen in the OECD Convention,
determining whether corporations are liable, criminally or civilly, is a
remedial issue that is left to the nation states. 221
The Seventh Circuit considered whether corporations are a class
of defendants that the ATS can reach. Once the Seventh Circuit carved
out this discreet issue, it is able to answer it quickly as the issue is
rather straightforward. Under U.S. federal common law, corporations
are liable for transgressions committed by their agents criminally and
civilly. 222
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of why corporations should be
liable under the ATS is certainly unconventional: the decision is short;
it is conspicuously void of Erie analysis and jurisdictional questions
that occupy a place in other analyses; and it is considers policy
implications. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Flomo
squares with those opinions that incorporate other branches of analysis
such as the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. The
Seventh Circuit’s holding can be seen as a unique outlook that really
focuses in on the discreet issue of why corporations can be subject to
liability under the ATS. And, while the court does not jump through
the conventional hoops, it does cover all the bases.
The issue of corporate liability under the ATS is merely one
consideration in the development ATS jurisprudence, yet it is such an
219

Id.
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
220
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important consideration because it opens the door to possible
expansion of international law by the domestic system. At the same
time, international mechanisms for corporate accountability are few in
number. The ATS might just be a way to encourage corporate
responsibility. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co. correctly held corporations to be accountable for
their international law transgressions under the ATS. Flomo’s
conclusion is clear: holding that a corporation can be sued under the
ATS is by no means an automatic guarantee that a plaintiff will collect
damages from the corporation. Corporate liability under ATS is
reserved for the most egregious violations of well-entrenched and
internationally-recognized violations. Thus, the ATS simultaneously
protects against completely barring foreign plaintiffs’ claims while
safeguarding against abuse of the statute. Notwithstanding that foreign
plaintiffs now have an extra tool in their legal toolbox to seek
reparation from corporations in certain U.S. circuits, uniformity
among the circuits is required. This uniformity should come in the
form of Supreme Court ruling that holds corporations liable under the
ATS where the facts support such liability.
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